A division bench refused to accept the contention that as per section 509 (which penalises any words uttered to insult a woman), the word ‘uttered’ would only mean ‘spoken words’ and not words ‘written’ on an email or social media posts etc.

“Such principles must all be understood within the context of legislative intent. The legislature wand action of the offender as could be considered within reason perhaps shocking to that woman. This is not confined simply or only to the offender’s mouth or his/her hand action of an abuse. The word utterances include such essential communication as taking of oaths, talking, shouting, writing, and all these and more can be in form of words relayed verbally or on any electronic device,” the bench noted.

In so doing, the bench opined that the FIR prima facie reveals the commission of the offence punishable under section 509 of the IPC and declined to quash it. It also refused to quash the invocation of section 67 of the Information & Technology Act. It did, however, strike down the FIR to the extent of invocation of section 354.

As themes and issues change in societies, the interpretation of law should change as well to respond fittingly to new challenges and facilitate furtherance of social ideals, the court indicated and added that the law capable of changing to meet the demands and values of an ever-changing society. “It has to be viewed as consistent with the objects aimed at by legislation. Deterring the conduct of the criminal being one of the aims of the legislature should act which may be construed as able to imperil the integrity of a woman. The way the offender does this is not restricted to oral abuse or gestures alone. The word, utterances include, but are not limited to, utterance of speeches, expressing opinions, findings etc. such statements can equally be relayed through use of text and technology,” the bench pointed out.

The bench said that the FIRs abuse of a woman with an intention of discouraging her from proceeding with her appeal prima facie makes out the offence under section 509 of the IPC. It dismissed the prayer to strike down the invocation of offence under section 67 of the Information & Technology Act. It, however, quashed the FIR to the extent of invoking Section 354.

The Court additionally cited Haries vs State of Kerala, where it was observed that several anonymous letters sent to a woman, which contained offensive and foul words and upset her modesty, also constitute finder moved which is criminal within the precepts of Section 509, IPC.

Consequently, the Court proceeding from the same line of thought, said that words and gestures which are sent through e-mails also fall within the purview of 509 IPC.

The Court referred to K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, wherein the Supreme stated, “to live is to live with dignity…so fundamental is dignity that it permeates the core of the rights guaranteed to the individual by Part III…right to privacy is an element of human dignity.

The opinion of the Court, as is mirrored on the content of the e-mails, that emails were indeed more likely to violate her modesty but were also equivalent to invasion of her privacy.

The expression “I like to take trouble dressing a corpse-a perfect undertaker they call me,” was not found to constitute a threat to cause death or grievous hurt.

Considering the above, the Court was not inclined to quash the FIR insofar as the offences punishable under Section 509 of IPC and Section 67 of the IT Act were concerned. However, the offences punishable under Sections 354 and 506(2) of IPC were deleted from the FIR. The Court, however, clarified that the observations (stated as above), were only on the correctness of the offences invoked in the FIR.