The Supreme Court has clarified the scope of Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), holding that merely failing to fulfil a promise of marriage does not constitute the offence of sexual intercourse through deceitful means. The Court emphasised that, for Section 69 BNS to apply, the promise to marry must have been made without any intention of fulfilling it from the very beginning.

In Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani v. State of Gujarat & Anr., a Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran quashed an FIR registered under Section 69 BNS after finding that the allegations in the complaint indicated a consensual romantic relationship rather than sexual intercourse obtained through fraudulent or deceitful inducement.

Background of the Case

The petitioner and the complainant first came into contact through a digital platform. Their interaction developed into friendship and subsequently into a romantic relationship. According to the complaint, during their first physical meeting, the petitioner expressed his desire to marry the complainant.

The complainant subsequently consented to sexual relations with the petitioner in February 2024. The two also stayed together at a hotel for two days in April 2024.

Later, the petitioner allegedly refused to marry the complainant, stating that his mother did not approve of the relationship. The complainant consequently approached the police, resulting in the registration of an FIR under Section 69 BNS.

The petitioner sought quashing of the proceedings. However, the Gujarat High Court declined to interfere and relied upon the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana. The petitioner thereafter approached the Supreme Court.

What Does Section 69 BNS Provide?

Section 69 of the BNS creates a distinct offence concerning sexual intercourse obtained through deceitful means, including a situation where a man makes a promise to marry a woman without any intention of fulfilling that promise.

The provision is significant because it creates a specific statutory offence for conduct involving fraudulent sexual relationships that may not satisfy the ingredients of rape.

The Supreme Court therefore examined whether the allegations in the present case disclosed the essential element of deceitful intention at the inception of the promise.

Distinction Between a False Promise and a Genuine Promise That Is Later Broken

The Court drew an important distinction between:

1. A promise of marriage made from the outset with no intention of fulfilling it; and
2. A genuine promise or intention to marry that is subsequently not fulfilled because of circumstances arising later.

Section 69 BNS is attracted in the first situation. A subsequent inability or refusal to marry, by itself, cannot automatically establish that the original promise was fraudulent.

The Court observed that the language of Section 69, particularly the expression relating to a promise to marry made “without any intention of fulfilling the same,” requires the existence of deceitful intention when the promise was made.

Thus, the prosecution must establish more than the mere fact that a relationship ended or that the accused subsequently declined to marry.

Reliance on the Principle in Deepak Gulati

The Gujarat High Court had relied upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in Deepak Gulati v. State of Haryana. The Supreme Court, while considering that decision, reiterated the underlying principle that criminal liability cannot ordinarily arise merely because a promise concerning a future marriage was ultimately not fulfilled.

The relevant question is whether the accused never intended to honour the promise at the time it was made.

The Court explained that a person may genuinely intend to marry but later be unable to do so because of circumstances beyond their control. Such subsequent failure does not necessarily transform the original promise into a fraudulent one.

Importantly, the Court also noted that Deepak Gulati was decided in the context of the IPC, at a time when there was no specific statutory provision corresponding to the present Section 69 BNS.

Section 69 BNS Creates a Separate Offence

The Supreme Court highlighted an important development brought about by the BNS.

Under the IPC framework, allegations concerning sexual intercourse following a false promise of marriage were generally examined through the provisions relating to rape and consent obtained under misconception of fact, particularly Sections 375 and 90 IPC.

Under the BNS, the legislature has introduced Section 69 as a separate offence, thereby specifically addressing deceitful sexual relationships that fall within the statutory parameters of the provision.

However, the creation of a separate offence does not eliminate the requirement of proving the essential element of deceit.

The Court observed that Section 69 BNS brings the fraudulent conduct within a separate penal framework while retaining the requirement that the promise to marry was made with an intention that it would never be fulfilled.

Examination of the Allegations in the FIR

After examining the complaint, the Supreme Court found that the allegations did not disclose the necessary ingredients of Section 69 BNS.

The Court noted that the parties had met through a digital platform and had developed a friendship that subsequently turned into a love relationship. The complaint itself stated that the petitioner had expressed his desire to marry the complainant at their first physical meeting.

However, the complaint did not specifically state that the complainant had consented to sexual intercourse because of a promise of marriage that the petitioner had made without intending to fulfil.

This distinction was crucial to the Court’s reasoning.

The Bench observed that the statements contained in the complaint indicated a consensual relationship and did not establish that the petitioner had deceitfully induced the complainant into sexual intercourse.

No Allegation That Consent Was Conditional Upon the Marriage Promise

The Supreme Court further observed that the complaint did not allege that sexual intercourse on the first occasion was permitted specifically on the condition that the petitioner would marry the complainant.

The Court emphasised that the complainant’s own description of the events indicated that she had consented to the relationship following the petitioner’s entreaties, without expressly stating that such consent was given solely because of a fraudulent promise of marriage.

Therefore, the necessary causal connection between deceitful promise and consent to sexual intercourse was absent from the allegations.

Mother’s Disapproval and Subsequent Refusal to Marry

Another significant factor considered by the Supreme Court was the reason given for the subsequent refusal to marry.

According to the complaint, the petitioner declined to marry the complainant because his mother did not approve of the relationship.

The Court held that this circumstance, on the face of the complaint, indicated that the petitioner’s decision not to marry arose subsequently and did not demonstrate that he had entered into the relationship with a fraudulent intention from the beginning.

In other words, the alleged reason for the eventual refusal to marry did not itself establish that the original intention was deceitful.

Supreme Court’s Finding

After examining the entire factual matrix, the Supreme Court found no material indicating that the petitioner had obtained the complainant’s consent through deceitful means within the meaning of Section 69 BNS.

The Court concluded that the allegations disclosed a consensual relationship and failed to establish the essential ingredient of a promise of marriage made without the intention of fulfilling it.

Consequently, the Court held that there was no justification for permitting the criminal proceedings to continue.

The Supreme Court therefore quashed FIR No. 11196030250292 dated 20 May 2025, registered at Sayajiganh Police Station, Vadodara City, Gujarat.

Key Legal Takeaways

The judgment provides important guidance regarding the interpretation and application of Section 69 BNS:

1. Mere Breach of a Marriage Promise Is Not Sufficient

The subsequent failure to marry does not automatically constitute an offence under Section 69 BNS.

2. Intention at the Inception Is Crucial

The prosecution must establish that the promise to marry was made without any intention of fulfilling it from the outset.

3. Genuine Relationships Cannot Automatically Become Criminal Cases

Where the allegations themselves disclose a consensual romantic relationship, criminal proceedings cannot be sustained merely because the relationship subsequently ended or marriage did not take place.

4. Causal Connection Between Deceit and Consent Matters

There must be a connection between the alleged deceitful promise and the woman’s consent to sexual intercourse. A mere assertion that a marriage was discussed is not necessarily sufficient.

5. Section 69 BNS Is Distinct from the Law of Rape

Section 69 BNS specifically creates an offence concerning sexual intercourse obtained through the deceitful means identified in the provision. It operates separately from the offence of rape and must be interpreted according to its own statutory ingredients.

6. Subsequent Circumstances Can Be Relevant

The reason for the subsequent refusal to marry may be relevant in determining whether the original promise was genuinely made or was fraudulent from the beginning.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court’s decision in Kunal Rameshbhai Kalyani v. State of Gujarat & Anr. provides an important clarification on the newly introduced Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

The judgment reinforces the principle that criminal liability cannot be founded solely on the fact that a relationship or promise of marriage ultimately failed. What is critical is the intention behind the promise at the time it was made.

Where the material placed before the Court indicates a consensual relationship and does not disclose that the accused entered into the relationship with a fraudulent intention never to marry, the ingredients of Section 69 BNS may not be satisfied.

The ruling therefore underscores the need for courts to carefully distinguish between a genuinely intended promise that is subsequently broken and a false promise deliberately made as a means of obtaining sexual consent. Such a distinction is central to ensuring that Section 69 BNS is applied consistently with its legislative purpose while preventing the criminalisation of every failed relationship.