The Allahabad High Court has held that appearance through Video Conferencing (VC) is not a fundamental or absolute right of a litigant, but a facility intended to provide convenience and expedite adjudication, the use of which remains subject to the discretion of the Court.

In a significant judgment concerning the conduct of a petitioner-in-person, a Bench comprising Justice Saurabh Shyam Shamshery observed that where a Court specifically directs a litigant to appear physically, the direction must ordinarily be complied with and cannot be avoided merely by asserting a preference for virtual appearance.

The ruling came in Vemula Venkata Vinay Babu Alias Vinay Vemula v. State of U.P. and 3 Others, Writ-C No. 547 of 2024, decided on 5 August 2026. While deciding the writ petition, the Court also examined the petitioner’s repeated RTI applications concerning court proceedings, an application seeking action against respondents for alleged non-filing of a counter affidavit, and the petitioner’s refusal to physically appear despite a specific judicial direction. The Court ultimately dismissed the writ petition and imposed aggregate costs of ₹6.70 lakh.

 

Background of the Case

The writ petition was instituted in 2024 by Vemula Venkata Vinay Babu alias Vinay Vemula, challenging an order dated 28 July 2023 passed by the Uttar Pradesh State Information Commission, Lucknow.

The matter initially proceeded through an Advocate, Prateek Samadhiya, and was filed on 5 January 2024. During the course of proceedings, the petitioner sought permission to appear as a petitioner-in-person and also requested permission to participate through Video Conferencing.

The case subsequently went through several stages before different Benches of the Allahabad High Court. The record shows that the petitioner appeared in person on certain occasions and also appeared through Video Conferencing on other dates.

An important development occurred on 24 July 2026, when Justice Saurabh Shyam Shamshery directed that the matter be listed for final hearing on 5 August 2026 at 12:30 PM.

On that occasion, the petitioner had initially appeared through Video Conferencing from Hyderabad. Although the video link was initially not connected, it was subsequently established. The petitioner then assured the Court that he would remain physically present when the matter was listed for final hearing.

The Court specifically recorded that if the petitioner failed to appear on the next date, the writ petition could be decided ex parte.

 

Dispute Over Physical Appearance

When the matter was taken up for final hearing on 5 August 2026, the petitioner did not appear physically before the Allahabad High Court. Instead, he joined the proceedings through Video Conferencing.

The Court considered this conduct to be contrary to its earlier direction.

The petitioner reportedly insisted that he would not appear physically because he had to travel approximately 2,000 kilometres and was facing logistical difficulties.

The Court, however, noted that the petitioner was aware of alternative arrangements that could facilitate his appearance. In particular, the Court observed that assistance could be sought from the State Legal Services Authority and that the matter could be fixed for a particular date and time to reduce the inconvenience associated with travel.

The Court also noted that the petitioner had previously travelled to Allahabad/Prayagraj and appeared before the Court on several occasions.

Against this background, the Court found that the logistical difficulty cited by the petitioner did not justify disregarding the specific direction to appear in person.

 

Video Conferencing Is Not an Absolute Right

The most significant legal observation in the judgment concerns the status of virtual hearings.

The petitioner had asserted that appearing through Video Conferencing was his fundamental right.

The Court rejected this contention.

It held that Video Conferencing is essentially a mode of convenience, intended to facilitate litigants and Advocates and to assist in expediting adjudication. It does not create an enforceable entitlement to participate virtually whenever a litigant chooses.

The Court stated:

“Appearance through Video Conferencing is only to facilitate a litigant or an Advocate to expedite the adjudication. It cannot be claimed a matter of right.”

The Court further clarified that the decision whether to permit Video Conferencing rests with the Court.

Thus, even though modern courts increasingly utilise technology and hybrid hearings, the availability of virtual infrastructure does not mean that every litigant can insist upon appearing remotely in every proceeding.

 

Court’s Discretion Remains Central

The judgment draws an important distinction between the availability of technology and the legal entitlement to use that technology.

The existence of Video Conferencing facilities may make judicial proceedings more accessible, particularly for litigants and lawyers located far away. However, the Court retains control over the manner in which proceedings are conducted.

Accordingly, a litigant may request permission to appear through Video Conferencing, but the request remains subject to judicial consideration.

Where the Court has already directed personal appearance, the direction assumes greater significance.

The Court expressly held that:

“If a direction is passed by the Court to appear in-person, that has to be followed without any unreasonable excuse.”

The ruling therefore reinforces the principle that procedural directions of a Court cannot be unilaterally modified by a litigant.

 

Why Physical Appearance May Still Be Required

The judgment is particularly relevant in the context of increasing adoption of hybrid and virtual court hearings.

Video Conferencing has become an important component of modern judicial administration. It can reduce travel, facilitate access to courts and enable proceedings to continue despite geographical barriers.

However, the Allahabad High Court’s ruling indicates that virtual proceedings should not be understood as replacing the Court’s authority to require personal attendance.

There may be circumstances in which physical presence is considered necessary for example, where the Court needs direct interaction with a litigant, where the conduct of proceedings requires greater supervision, or where the Court has concerns regarding the manner in which a litigant is participating.

In such situations, a litigant cannot treat the virtual mode as an alternative that is automatically available merely because the technology exists.

 

Petitioner’s Application to Appear in Person

The Court also examined the procedural history surrounding the petitioner’s request to appear in person.

The petition had originally been filed through Advocate Prateek Samadhiya. Subsequently, on 5 May 2025, the petitioner sought permission to appear as petitioner-in-person, requested discharge of his counsel and additionally sought permission to appear through Video Conferencing.

The application was disposed of on 8 May 2025.

However, according to the Court’s reading of the record, the order did not discharge the petitioner’s counsel and did not grant permission to the petitioner either to appear personally or to appear through Video Conferencing.

The Court therefore concluded that the petitioner could not rely upon the earlier application as having conferred an absolute right to virtual appearance.

 

 

 

Controversy Over Counter Affidavit

The Court also considered another application filed by the petitioner seeking punishment of certain respondents for alleged non-compliance with directions relating to the filing of a counter affidavit.

The petitioner alleged that the respondents had failed to file the required counter affidavit despite directions of the Court.

The High Court, however, found the application to be misconceived and contrary to the record.

The Court noted that a counter affidavit on behalf of the State Information Commission had already been filed and that a copy had been served upon the petitioner’s counsel. The record also indicated that the respondents against whom the application had been directed were not themselves required to file the affidavit in question.

Consequently, the Court dismissed the application and imposed a cost of ₹50,000.

 

24 RTI Applications Concerning Court Proceedings

Another major aspect of the judgment concerned the petitioner’s use of the Right to Information Act, 2005.

The Court had earlier taken note of multiple RTI applications filed by the petitioner seeking information concerning proceedings in the same writ petition.

On 24 July 2026, the Court had already observed that such applications were causing hindrance to the administration of justice. It directed that any pending proceedings relating to such applications be kept in abeyance and directed the petitioner not to file further RTI applications concerning the matter until the writ petition was finally decided.

Despite this direction, according to a report placed before the Court by the Deputy Registrar (RTI), the petitioner filed 24 RTI applications between 4 June and 17 July 2026.

The applications sought a wide range of information concerning the internal functioning and administration of the Court.

Among the information sought were:

• Internal office note sheets;
• Official routing sheets;
• Action Taken Reports;
• Court attendance registers;
• Bench Secretary log entries;
• File movement registers;
• Administrative records concerning roster arrangements;
• Cisco Webex session logs;
• Network and server records;
• Login and logout information;
• Reasons for supplementary cause lists;
• Reasons for matters being marked “Passed Over”; and
• Other administrative information concerning the processing and listing of cases.

 

Court Finds Misuse of RTI Mechanism

The High Court took a serious view of the repeated RTI applications.

According to the Court, such applications were not merely consuming the time of court employees but were also creating an obstruction in the administration of justice.

The Court observed that the petitioner appeared to have sufficient time to pursue multiple RTI applications but was unwilling to appear before the Court and argue the substantive case.

The Court therefore concluded that the RTI mechanism was being misused in the circumstances of the case.

All 24 applications were directed to be consigned to the record.

The Court imposed ₹5,000 for each of the 24 applications, resulting in a total cost of:

24 × ₹5,000 = ₹1,20,000

This amount was in addition to the separate ₹50,000 cost imposed on the application concerning the alleged non-filing of the counter affidavit.

 

 

 

“Formal Written Declaration of Protest” Also Considered

The Court also took note of an email placed on record by the petitioner under the heading “Formal Written Declaration of Protest.”

The Court noted that the document was not verified before an Oath Commissioner or Notary.

It further found the heading to be vague and considered it contemptuous in the circumstances.

More importantly, the document reportedly contained the petitioner’s assertion that virtual Video Conferencing constituted a fundamental right.

The Court reiterated that this proposition was legally incorrect.

According to the Court, Video Conferencing is a convenience available at the discretion of the Court and not a fundamental right of a litigant.

 

Court’s Concern About Court Decorum

The judgment also records the Court’s concerns regarding the petitioner’s conduct in proceedings before different courts.

The Bench referred to instances in the Supreme Court, various High Courts and the Allahabad High Court where, according to the Court, the petitioner-in-person had not maintained appropriate court decorum and had acted in what the Court described as a hurried and unruly manner.

The Court additionally expressed concern regarding the use of video recordings in a manner that could allegedly malign the image of courts.

The Court observed that if the petitioner appeared physically, an Advocate could potentially be appointed to assist him in arguing the matter.

Despite this, according to the judgment, the petitioner remained unwilling to appear physically and continued to rely on logistical difficulties associated with travel.

 

Main RTI Dispute Before the Court

Despite the procedural controversies, the High Court ultimately examined the substantive challenge raised by the petitioner.

The writ petition challenged an order dated 28 July 2023 passed by the Uttar Pradesh State Information Commission.

The underlying RTI request had sought information relating to certain complaints and inquiries, including whether complaints had been made against the petitioner, details concerning such complaints, and information regarding communications allegedly made by the Cyber Cell, among other matters.

The High Court examined the information sought and the responses supplied by the authorities.

 

Information Had Already Been Supplied

The State Information Commission had dismissed the petitioner’s appeal on the ground that the requisite information had already been supplied through a registered post dated 11 January 2023.

The High Court noted that the petitioner had not denied receiving the information.

Further, the Court observed that the petitioner had not placed the information allegedly supplied to him on the record to demonstrate that the authorities had failed to provide the information required under the RTI Act.

The Court therefore found no sufficient basis to interfere with the State Information Commission’s order.

It also emphasised that a person cannot insist upon being supplied information that is not available with the concerned public authority.

Consequently, the Court found that the essential information sought by the petitioner had already been provided and that there was no legal reason to interfere with the Commission’s decision.

 

Writ Petition Dismissed with Further ₹5 Lakh Cost

After considering the merits of the petition and the conduct of the proceedings, the Allahabad High Court dismissed the writ petition.

The Court imposed a further cost of ₹5 lakh, expressly stating that the purpose was to discourage conduct that disturbed court proceedings and the administration of justice.

The final calculation of costs was:

Particulars	Cost
Cost on application concerning alleged non-filing of counter affidavit	₹50,000
24 RTI applications × ₹5,000 each	₹1,20,000
Further cost imposed while dismissing writ petition	₹5,00,000
Total	₹6,70,000

The Court directed the petitioner to deposit the entire ₹6.70 lakh in the bank account of the High Court Legal Services Committee within four weeks.

It further directed that, in the event of default, the Registrar General should take appropriate steps.

 

Key Legal Principles Emerging from the Judgment

The judgment provides several important takeaways concerning virtual hearings, judicial discipline and the use of the RTI Act.

1. Virtual hearing is not an absolute right

A litigant cannot insist upon participating through Video Conferencing merely because the facility is available.

2. Virtual appearance is a facilitative mechanism

The primary purpose of Video Conferencing is to facilitate litigants and Advocates and assist in expeditious adjudication.

3. The Court retains control over the mode of hearing

The ultimate decision to permit or refuse virtual appearance rests with the Court.

4. Judicial directions must be respected

Once the Court specifically directs a person to appear physically, the direction must be complied with unless there is a legally acceptable justification or the Court itself modifies the direction.

5. Technology does not override judicial procedure

The increasing use of technology in courts does not diminish the Court’s authority to regulate its own proceedings.

6. RTI cannot be used to obstruct judicial administration

The judgment demonstrates that repeated RTI applications concerning internal court administration may attract judicial scrutiny where they are found to interfere with the functioning of the Court.

7. Costs can be imposed for abuse of process

The Court used its power to impose substantial costs where it found repeated applications, incorrect assertions and procedural conduct to be disruptive.

 

Significance of the Judgment for Virtual Courts in India

The judgment assumes significance in the post-pandemic era, when Video Conferencing has become an established component of India’s judicial system.

Virtual hearings have substantially improved accessibility to courts. They can reduce travel expenses, assist lawyers and litigants who are located in distant jurisdictions and make certain procedural hearings more efficient.

However, the Allahabad High Court’s ruling highlights an important limitation: access to virtual proceedings does not amount to an unconditional entitlement to choose the mode of appearance.

The judgment therefore reinforces the distinction between technological accessibility and procedural entitlement.

Courts may permit hybrid hearings where circumstances justify them, but the litigant remains bound by the orders governing the particular case.

This principle is especially relevant for petitioners-in-person, who may not always have the same procedural familiarity as practising Advocates. While courts can facilitate access to justice, such facilitation operates within the framework of judicial discipline and the directions issued in the proceedings.

 

Balancing Access to Justice With Court Discipline

At a broader level, the decision reflects the continuing challenge of balancing access to justice with the need to preserve the orderly administration of judicial proceedings.

Virtual hearings can undoubtedly address geographical barriers. A litigant located thousands of kilometres away may face genuine financial and logistical difficulties in attending every hearing physically.

At the same time, the judicial process requires the Court to have the authority to determine when personal presence is necessary.

The solution, therefore, is not to treat virtual hearings as either universally available or inherently undesirable. Instead, the mode of appearance must remain responsive to the circumstances of the case and the directions of the concerned Court.

The Allahabad High Court’s formulation places this balance firmly within the Court’s discretion.

 

Conclusion

The Allahabad High Court’s decision in Vemula Venkata Vinay Babu Alias Vinay Vemula v. State of U.P. and 3 Others is significant for its clear statement that Video Conferencing is a facility and convenience, not a fundamental right.

The Court made it clear that while technology can facilitate access to justice and expedite adjudication, it cannot be invoked by a litigant to disregard a specific judicial direction requiring physical appearance.

The judgment also demonstrates that the right to access statutory mechanisms such as the RTI Act, 2005 cannot be exercised in a manner that, in the Court’s assessment, obstructs judicial administration. Repeated applications seeking extensive internal court records, particularly after a judicial direction concerning such applications, may result in adverse consequences.

Ultimately, the decision underscores three interconnected principles: judicial discretion, compliance with court orders and responsible use of legal processes.

The case also serves as a reminder that the digitisation of courts does not alter the fundamental relationship between a litigant and the Court. Technology may provide the means of participation, but the Court retains the authority to determine how and under what circumstances that participation will take place.