Home  > Recent Judgements  > POWER TO CONDONE DELAY LIES ONLY WITH COURTS, NOT TRIBUNALS UNLESS STATUTE EXPRESSLY PERMITS:  SAYS SUPREME COURT

Jan  08- 2026

POWER TO CONDONE DELAY LIES ONLY WITH COURTS, NOT TRIBUNALS UNLESS STATUTE EXPRESSLY PERMITS:  SAYS SUPREME COURT

THE PROPERTY COMPANY (P) LTD. V. ROHINTEN DADDY MAZDA

Introduction

In a significant ruling given by Supreme Court on Wednesday 07th of January 2026, reaffirming the strict contours of Limitation Law, the Court has held that the power to condone delay under the Limitation Act, 1963 lies exclusively with courts and not with tribunals or quasi-judicial bodies, unless such power is expressly conferred by statute. The judgement clarifies the legal position on whether authorities like the Company Law Board (CLB) could invoke Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to excuse delayed filings.

The decision was rendered by a Bench comprising Justices J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, setting aside the judgement of the Calcutta High Court, which had upheld the CLB’s condonation of a substantial delay.

Factual Background

The dispute arose from a claim for transmission of shares based on a will executed by the respondent’s mother. Although probate of the will had been granted as early as 1990, the respondent approached the company for transmission only in March 2013. The company rejected the request in April 2013.

Under the Companies Act, 1956, an appeal against such refusal was required to be filed before the Company Law Board within two months. This statutory period was missed.

During the transition phase to the Companies Act, 2013, and before the constitution of the NCLT, the respondent filed an appeal before the CLB in February 2014, with a delay of 249 days. The CLB condoned the delay, a decision later affirmed by the Calcutta High Court prompting the company to approach the Supreme Court.

Core Legal Issue

The central question before the Court was:

Can a tribunal or quasi-judicial authority condone delay by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in the absence of an express statutory provision granting such power?

Supreme Court’s Findings

Allowing the appeal, the Supreme Court categorically ruled against the condonation of delay by the CLB.

The Court observed:

“The provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 would only apply to suits, applications or appeals, as the case may be, which are made under any law to ‘courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals are specifically empowered in that regard.”

Setting aside the High Court’s judgement, the Court held:

“The High Court could be said to have committed an error in dismissing the statutory appeal filed under Section 10F of the Erstwhile Act and thereby, affirming the order of the CLB condoning the delay of 249 days in filing the appeal under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013.”

Non-Retrospective Application of Section 433, Companies Act, 2013

The respondent argued that Section 433 of the Companies Act, 2013, which applies the Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings before the NCLT and NCLAT, should benefit him. The Court rejected this contention, holding:

“Section 433 of the Act, 2013 which empowers the NCLT and the NCLAT respectively to apply the provisions of the Act, 1963 cannot be borrowed to signify the existence of a similar power with respect to the CLB.”

Further, the Court emphasized:

“The remedy of the respondent was already time-barred before the coming into force of Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013, let alone the coming into force of Section 433 of the Act, 2013. Hence, the change in law cannot inure to the benefit of the present respondent.”

Principles Summarised by the Court

The Supreme Court comprehensively summarised the law governing limitation and condonation of delay in relation to tribunals. Key takeaways include:

  • “The provisions of the Act, 1963 would only apply to ‘courts’ and not to those made before quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless such bodies are specifically empowered.”
  • “The power to extend time under Section 5 of the Act, 1963 cannot be resorted to by statutory authorities, quasi-judicial bodies or tribunals, unless expressly indicated.”
  • “When such authorities are deemed to be a court for certain limited purposes, such a legal fiction must not be extended beyond the purpose for which the fiction was created.”
  • “There exists a vital distinction between the principles underlying Sections 5 and 14 of the Act, 1963.”
  • “Regulation 44 of the CLB Regulations which saves the inherent power of the CLB would not enable the CLB to extend time for the filing of the appeal.”
  • “The simpliciter limitation period prescribed under Section 58(3) of the Act, 2013 must not be read to be merely directory.”

Significance of the Judgement

This judgement is a clear reaffirmation of statutory discipline in limitation law. It underscores that:

  • Tribunals cannot assume equitable powers akin to courts unless expressly authorised.
  • Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is court-centric, rooted in judicial discretion.
  • Legislative intent must be respected, and limitation periods cannot be diluted through inherent or implied powers.

The ruling brings certainty to corporate and tribunal litigation, particularly for matters arising during transitional legislative phases.

Conclusion

By drawing a firm line between courts and tribunals, the Supreme Court has reinforced that condonation of delay is a matter of statutory power, not procedural sympathy. The decision in THE PROPERTY COMPANY (P) LTD. V. ROHINTEN DADDY MAZDA will serve as a key precedent for limitation-related disputes before tribunals and quasi-judicial authorities across India.

Accordingly, the appeal was allowed.